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Abstract 
 
Schumpeter’s idea that innovations can be described as new combinations often is understood 
as a mere metaphor and slight generalization of what he considers as the characterizing 
feature of entrepreneurship. The main argument of this paper is that more and deeper issues 
are involved in the concept of new combinations than is commonly understood. Moreover, a 
proper understanding of these issues would not only enhance our knowledge about observed 
innovation processes in economic life, it might reveal several properties common to creative 
processes in general. 
 
                                                 
* Paper presented at the ISS conference 2004, Bocconi University (Milano, Italy), 2004. The authors thank Mark 
Perlman and Richard Nelson for valuable comments on a first version of this paper. 
 
Introduction 
 
It has to be observed that the notion of new combinations immediately implies that there 
already exist elements which are combined anew. To determine what these elements are and 
how their properties enable and restrict possible combination clearly is not a trivial task. In 
chapter 1 of the paper a systematic approach to this analytic challenge is described. For any 
area of innovation it should provide a set of combinable, though not necessarily smallest 
elements. Though linkages between elements are surely restricted, in many cases the number 
of elements still is so large that any fully enumerated search through al combinatorial 
possibilities is finite but untreatable. This evidently is the point where another famous concept 
of Schumpeter enters the scene: his ‘animal spirits’ of the entrepreneur provide a stylish short-
cut to circumvent - not to solve - this problem. 
 
Chapter 2 of the paper presents another, more recent formal treatment of the re-combination 
problem, namely genetic algorithms. Indeed, this extremely successful algorithmic device that 
was built akin to observed biological selection processes is nothing less than a surprising 
implementation of the concept of ‘new combinations’. The basic elements just have to be 
translated into bit strings, i.e. symbols that represent them. The secret of the success of genetic 
algorithms, and at the same time its weakest point is the assumption of a given and well-
defined fitness function – in some sense the opposite extreme to Schumpeter’s metaphysical 
‘animal spirits’. But as already was the case with the latter an exogenously given fitness 
function seems to circumvent the re-combination problem rather than to solve it. The almost 
costless evaluation of this function lets the original problem degenerate into a simple, 
algorithmic search problem. A search problem that, of course, genetic algorithms are 
exceptionally well suited to solve. Still a lot can be learned from genetic algorithms with 
respect to re-combination. Not the least is knowledge about the necessity and quantitative 
amount of random elements in re-combination. The chapter thus provides a brief introduction 
into a basic toolbox of evolutionary modeling, defines basic concepts like selection, variety 
and growth, presents the skeleton of genetic algorithms and in the end incorporates central 
questions elaborated in chapter 1 into this framework. 
 
Finally chapter 3 of the paper inspects several research areas that have produced empirical 
material on creative and innovative human activities. Since the preceding chapters identified 
the missing evaluation possibilities for trial combinations as crucial, it is only straightforward 
to take a closer look at existing empirical solutions to learn something about their general 
features. 
 
1 – Some semantics for set theory, or ‘who combines what’.  
 
The expression ‘new combination’ makes only sense if it is contrasted with the background of 
elements currently bound in old combinations. The concept of combination itself immediately 
implies a kind of set theoretic view of process elements being members of a larger overall 
process. The idea that in the course of time elements from different old overall processes 
might be copied and combined to form new overall processes adds dynamics to the usually 
static set theoretic framework. Such a theory of development aims at two goals: It should be 
able to explain how old combinations came about in the past in the first place, and it should 
suggest some hypothesis how and where contemporary new combinations will emerge. 
 
Note as a side issue that Schumpeter’s distinctive view that his theory of development is a 
contraposition to his own early work in the Walras-Jevons-Menger tradition, his ‘Das Wesen 
und der Hauptinhalt der Nationalökonome’ [Schumpeter, 1908 (1970)], is fully justified. Of 
course, later formalization of Walrasian systems showed that set theory formidably lends 
itself to the description of possible exchange acts of owners (sets) of commodities (elements) 
with endogenous relative prices and exogenously given preferences of owners. But till today 
the major thrust of this body of theory, despite its formal sophistication concentrates on 
comparative static of such systems; entry and exit of commodity owners is mostly left to 
demography and business demography. Yet Schumpeter was the first to emphasize that it is 
exactly the dynamic part of the story that not only explains history, i.e. most of the essential 
economic developments since the industrial revolution, it is also the necessary background to 
understand the empirical content of the static part at all, i.e. the latter is logically dominated 
by the dynamics of development. Indeed it is current research in evolutionary economics that 
is on its way to attract more and more mainstream economists for precisely these reasons. 
 
The concept of ‘new combinations’ thus opens up a dynamic view not only on the dimensions 
of the technology space and the preference space of existing economic agents, it also allows 
for a reshuffling of the dimensions of the agents’ space itself. The latter idea is the source of 
most of the evolutionary approaches to institutional economics. 
In a very direct form1 this line of argument can be found in ‘Business Cycles’ [Schumpeter, 
1939 (1969)]. First economic evolution is defined: 
 
‘… we immediately realize that innovation is the outstanding fact in the economic history of 
capitalist society or in what is purely economic in that history, and also that it is largely 
responsible for most of what we would at first sight attribute to other factors. … The changes 
in the economic process brought about by innovation, together with all their effects, and the 
                                                 
1 The reason for the use of the formulations found in Schumpeter’s later work rather than the ones found in his 
earlier text [Schumpeter, 1911 (1964), p.99] is the more systematic treatment of the former.  
response to them by the economic system, we shall designate by the term Economic 
Evolution.’  [Schumpeter, 1939 (1969), p.61] 
 
In short, it is innovation that drives the dynamics of the interdependent economic evolution. 
Then the concept of innovation in capitalist firms is defined in two different, but 
complementary ways: 
 
‘Therefore, we will simply define innovation as the setting up of a new production function. 
This covers the case of a new commodity, as well as those of a new form of organization such 
as a merger, of the opening up of new markets, and so on. … we may express the same thing 
by saying that innovation combines factors in a new way, or that it consists in carrying out 
New Combinations.’ [Schumpeter, 1939 (1969), p.62] (Emphasis added by the authors) 
 
So here the magical term appears. And Schumpeter immediately adds a third characterization 
of innovation that adds a further dimension – the monetary system - but cannot localize where 
innovation actually appeared: 
 
‘We can define innovation also with reference to money cost. … Whenever a given quantity 
of output costs less to produce than the same or a smaller quantity did cost or would have cost 
before, we may be sure, if prices of factors have not fallen, that there has been innovation 
somewhere.’ [Schumpeter, 1939 (1969), p.63] 
 
For capitalist firms such a monetary indicator can be used to discover innovation, though its 
initiator might not be a member of the observed industry. In other words, it is the well-
developed monetary system that spreads the fruits of local innovations over the whole broad 
path of economic evolution. 
 
In discussing in the sequel the modus operandi of innovation another important idea pops up: 
 
‘…, we shall in general argue as if every innovation … were embodied in a New Firm 
founded for this purpose. … Most new firms are founded with an idea and for a definite 
purpose. The life goes out of them when that idea or purpose has been fulfilled or has become 
obsolete or even if, without having become obsolete, it has ceased to be new. That is the 
fundamental reason why firms do not exist forever. Many of them are, of course, failures from 
the start. Like human beings, firms are constantly being born that cannot live. Others may 
meet what is akin, in the case of men, to death from accident or illness. Still others die a 
“natural” death, as men die of old age. And the “natural” cause, in the case of firms, is 
precisely their inability to keep up the pace in innovating which they themselves had been 
instrumental in setting in the time of their vigor. No firm which is merely run on established 
lines, however conscientious the management of its routine business may be, remains in 
capitalist society a source of profit, and the day comes for each when it ceases to pay interest 
and even depreciation.’ [Schumpeter, 1939 (1969), p.69] (Emphasis added by the authors) 
 
In this paragraph Schumpeter not only identifies firms with their modus vivendi, i.e. 
innovation, he even generalizes the characteristics of these entities by the use of biological 
metaphor! The evolution of the firm structure starts to look “natural” in a way easily to be 
amenable to generalized evolutionary modeling. 
Since innovation - new combinations - are the central elixir of life of these entities one last 
distinguishing characteristic has to be introduced: innovations and inventions are different 
things. In Schumpeter’s words: 
 
‘… the making of the invention and the carrying out of the corresponding innovation are 
two entirely different things. … Personal aptitudes – primarily intellectual in the case of the 
inventor, primarily volitional in the case of the businessman who turns the invention into an 
innovation – and the methods by which the one and the other work, belong to different 
spheres.’ [Schumpeter, 1939 (1969), p.60]  (Emphasis added by the authors) 
 
This clear-cut  picture of the process of economic evolution, of its carriers and their central 
function - in Schumpeter’s own view, and despite his sidestep to a biological metaphor - 
refers to a well-defined historical episode, namely 19th century capitalism till World War I. 
The interwar period made Schumpeter already believe that this type of capitalism had finished 
its historical life-cycle (compare [Schumpeter, 1939 (1969), p.71]). 
 
The simple formula - historical task (innovation) needs a “natural” carrier (firm) that 
internally is organized by a leader (entrepreneur) – could be observed not to work any more in 
the 20th century. Something new was about to happen, Schumpeter sensed (compare 
[Schumpeter, 1942 (1980); 1947 (1987) p.193]). But still the central metaphor was valid: 
From which broken elements will new combinations be formed? 
 
It is therefore tempting to purify Schumpeter’s vision of industrial capitalism, the one just 
sketched in the previous paragraphs, by transforming it into a more formal description. The 
aim, of course, is not to produce an adequate model for contemporary economic dynamics; 
the setting from which this vision was derived has vanished in the already distant past. The 
objective of this exercise (that will be presented in the next chapter) rather is to get some 
experience in the use of the toolset itself. To see where its strengths and where its 
shortcomings are. Only then transplantation, indeed a transcription of the framework can be 
envisaged – the object investigated always influences the language in which this investigation 
is carried out. A formalization of Schumpeter’s vision of economic evolution therefore only is 
an effort to determine the starting point for the transcription. 
 
2 – A toolbox for evolutionary arguments 
 
The most important argument in Darwin’s path breaking work on the origin of species is that 
the existing variety of species is the result of a long-run selection process. This nowadays 
seemingly simple idea summarized Darwin’s observations during his exploratory journey to 
the Galapagos Islands [Darwin, 1836 (1997)]. The ingredients of this argument are two-fold: a 
set of individual members with different characteristics and an environment that in the course 
of time deletes members with unfavorable characteristics. Additionally the time structure that 
Darwin encountered on the Galapagos Islands proved to be an exceptionally clear-cut profile: 
Each island had been completely isolated for a long time, assuring long-run constant but for 
every island different environmental conditions. The adjustment of the species’ members to 
their island’s environment thus had a long time to run, with almost no influence on this 
environment taking place. Visiting different islands therefore enabled Darwin to study, i.e. to 
contrast, the respective adjustment processes. 
 
To express this scenario more formally, assume that there are n different types of a species 
entering a new, unchanging environment. Assume further that selection in this environment 
consists of letting only one type survive to the next time period. If the carrying capacity of the 
island equals the number of entities, n, entering the island in period 1 – one entity per type, 
then figure 1 depicts the invasion process. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Selection in a stable environment 
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only type 3 survives the first test. Then a growth process for the survivor sets in, in the 
example a doubling per period. Since the environment is stable the survival gate remains 
where it was, all selection appears in period 1, from then onwards the innate growth process 
of type 3 dominates population dynamics. The last phase finally starts when the capacity of 
the environment, the island, is reached and part of the offspring of the surviving type dies. In 
the example this appears in period 3, when two individuals out of an offspring of 8 exceed the 
capacity constraint of 6 and the two have to die. From then onwards phase 3 is characterized 
by a divergence between the potential growth rate of 100% and the actual growth rate of 0%; 
half of the individuals of each new born generation die2. 
 
This setting is almost as simple as the definition Herbert Simon writing almost a hundred 
years after Darwin gave: 
 
‘The simplest scheme of evolution is one that depends on two processes; a generator and a 
test. The task of the generator is to produce variety, new forms that have not existed 
previously, whereas the task of the test is to cull out the newly generated forms so that only 
those that are well fitted to the environment will survive.’ [Simon, 1969 (1985), p.52] 
Simon’s ‘generator of new forms’ takes place only as invasion of 6 new types in period 1, but 
on the other hand it is augmented by an innate growth process of types that does not produce 
new forms. The test consists also of a more narrow component, namely always the same rigid 
selection of the one surviving type; plus a constraint on the total number of individuals 
(independent of their types) that this environment is able to support. 
 
Despite its almost trivial setting this archetype of evolution allows for some interesting 
observations and questions:  
 
1. Consider the idea that the variety of types invading the environment might be variable. 
If the window of survival (type 3 in the example) is unknown to invaders, then the 
probability of invaders consisting only of one type to survive period 1 is very low. To 
be precise, with a window of size 1 and n possible types it would be 1
n
 , whereas m 
invading types, m n≤ , would have a chance of m
n
 that one of them passes to period 2. 
If survival in period 1 counts as a necessary condition for success of a species, then 
                                                 
2 Note that three distinct, sequential processes are involved in this example: an invasion of new territory, once 
arrived a selection process that sets in and modifies co-evolution of innate growth characteristics, and finally a 
capacity constrained that again modifies dynamics to conform to some upper limits of evolution. 
variety of types certainly contributes to it: There is a positive relationship between the 
variety of invaders and the survival probability of the species they belong to3. 
2. As soon as a type has survived, the whole force of selection has vanished and only the 
innate growth rate limits the population explosion of the selected type. The speed of 
the conquest of the environment, how long it will take to reach full capacity, only 
depends on the growth characteristics of this single type. This second component of 
success of a species thus hinges on the features of the single types4. 
3. At least after an adjustment period till phase 3, the stability of the environment, its 
feature of performing the same selection rule independent of time, is reflected in a 
stable reproduction and death process of just one monolithic type – or of no types at 
all.  The initial stimulus of the invading species thus at best is transformed into a time 
profile of structural stability that looks very much like the one the environment 
showed before the invasion. Just one more type of a species has been added5. 
4. Finally one could ask the question where the species with variety came from. If all 
environments were always stable and therefore only produced monotype species then 
there never would have been a chance for a group with high variety to develop. As a 
matter of logic this leaves open only two ways out: Either the world we describe 
always consisted of this set of monotype environments and the assumed invasions 
never occurred, or the stability of environments concerns only a long time as 
compared to the adjustment process of phase 1 and 2. Of course, the scientific answer6 
is the second answer. But this implies that in between relatively long periods of 
environmental stability, there must always be periods of turmoil. And reappearing 
successive stages of stability and turmoil mean that there will be some kind of long-
run periodicity. In other words the importance of time specifications, where stability 
always has to be understood as a short-run approximation within a long-run oscillation 
emerges as a logical consequence7.  
 
                                                 
3 Note that the survival probability of a single individual does not change if it is part of an invading group with 
higher variety, it remains unchanged. This observation opens a view on one of the most prominent debates in 
evolutionary biology: knowledge about survival of the species is embedded in the group structure and need not 
be necessarily experienced or known by individuals (compare John Maynard-Smith’s hawk-dove model, the 
textbook example for evolutionary game theory [Smith J. M., 1982]). 
4 A fractal approach to this problem is interesting: Interpret each single individual as a (micro-) ‘species’ of the 
individual features it exhibits. Its environment then evidently consists mainly of the original species within 
which it lives. For any small enough time slice a predominant co-evolutionary structure of species could then be 
determined. Interpretation of all living systems in that way enriches the understanding of the concept ‘nature’. 
5 Speculation certainly would suggest that in the long-run periodically changing environments will force their 
invaders into oscillations. 
6 It is remarkable that this logical crossroad encapsulates the profound contradiction between an emphasis on 
evolution and the position of externally given species held by the church in Darwin’s time. Darwin was very 
aware of this fundamental conflict and was rather afraid of provoking the church. 
7 As in the space domain a fractal approach to the time domain is looming in the background. 
Turn now to some simple extensions of this archetype8, which build on these remarks. 
Starting with the last one an obvious extension is to let the survival window move in the 
course of time. As a consequence any selected monotype species would be killed 
immediately. Turning the argument around this extreme vulnerability of monotype species 
makes it rather implausible that they have been selected in the first place. The really difficult 
question is: how does variation in a species emerge? The simplest, and in many respects 
most unsatisfactory answer came from the field of gene biology: There is random mutation on 
the gene level. A stochastic property, the radioactive fields surrounding genes is thought to be 
the ultimate cause of variation. Why this is an insufficient explanation of the observed 
evolution of living systems is evident even for researchers with a strong inclination to 
sociobiology: If a mutation of a single gene where favorable to a human individual the  
average chance that this mutation will occur in this individual would be about one to one 
billion! And then with some bad luck this advancement could even be destroyed by sexual 
reproduction9. In short, this type of improvement is much too slow to explain what has been 
observed as evolution on earth. Again turning the argument around, this small influence of 
mutation of random mutation can be interpreted as evolutionary favorable result: species with 
such small random disturbances on the gene level were actually selected. 
 
A second type of more sophisticated variation could emerge if one starts with the assumption 
of periodically changing environments. The immediate examples of such environments are 
the physical environments on earth changing with the season and with day and night. Imagine 
now that members of a species become different types due to their different adaptation speeds 
to the oscillations of the physical oscillations. Then it can easily be modeled that a certain 
variety of types will be selected by an evolutionary dynamics, e.g. the set of members whose 
adaptation frequency times a natural number gives exactly the frequency of the 
environment10. With respect to the third remark made above, this really provides a nice 
extension: Periodicity in the environment produces a structure of innate frequencies in the 
members of the species that mirrors this periodicity. 
 
The big leap forward in the evolution of living system clearly comes with the possibility of 
anticipation. And still no satisfactory theory explaining this evolutionary jump has been 
produced. It is known by many names and it roughly coincides with the emergence of 
                                                 
8 Stanley Metcalfe and his followers have developed and explored a different algorithmic archetype model that 
immediately uses business firms as entities. Though such a methodology is certainly more attractive for 
economists interested in specific questions in the area of competition policy and the like, it also bears the danger 
that easily imported concepts and ideas hide important, more essential problems (compare for example [Metcalfe 
J.S., 1998, pp. 40-103] ). On the other hand, despite the differences in specification, Metcalfe clearly shares the 
broad perspective underlying our approach in this paper (compare [Metcalfe J.S., 2002]). 
9 For details on this argument see [Smith J. M., 1988, p.167]. 
10 An elegant little model of this kind is provided by Paul Krugman [Krugman, 1996, pp.22-29]. He also gives 
the important hint that this feature is formally equivalent to a property of Fourier analysis.  
conscious memory and self-awareness. Time and space, Kant’s fundamental dimensions, open 
up in the brains of animals, and later in those of humans. 
In the context of the presented simple model, enriched by a periodically changing survival 
window, a correctly anticipating species evidently would let the chosen type follow this 
window. This outcome would have to assume at least two things: First, some central control 
of types that allows an immediate and complete switch from one type to the next type must 
exist. Second, the currently unfavorable types must somehow be preserved to reappear when 
they are needed again. These conditions clearly reshape the scope of interpretation of the 
model: Some kind of additional consciousness has to be injected on the level of the larger 
entity constituted by the individuals. There must be language to support anticipation and 
memory, and there must be transfer of the fruits of growth to those individuals that currently 
are not needed, but are anticipated to be important in the future. 
 
An important consequence of these more sophisticated circumstances is that the elementary 
concept of diversity, introduced above as a property of the invading set of individuals, now 
splits up into two different measures:  
(i) On the one hand there still remains the old measure that should give an idea about the 
variation of types in a set. This measure should reflect two ideas, namely that (a) variety 
increases if the share of types found in the set in the total number of possible types increases; 
and (b) that variety also increases if existing types are more uniformly distributed. A possible 
formulation of such a measure is what we call instantaneous diversity div: 
 
 ( )tt t
t
xdiv u V
z
= ⋅  (1.1) 
  
In this expression x is the number of types found in the species at time t, z is the number of all 
possible types of the species at time t, and u is a function that maps the distribution of actually 
found types, vector V, into the interval [0,1] , with uniform distribution corresponding to 1, 
which implies maximum instantaneous diversity as long as t tx z= .  
One possibility of a function u is to use the share of the actual variance of vector V in the 
maximum variance that the observed number of individuals using x types can produce. Let 
vector V consist of elements itv counting the individuals of type i. Then total population in 
time t is 
 it t
i
n v=∑  
 
Note that maximum variance 2maxσ  for population size n always is 
 
 2 2max, [1,1,1,...,1, ( ( 1))]t t tn xσ σ= − − . 
 
Function u then simply is defined as  
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Evidently instantaneous diversity defined that way will be normalized between 0 (no 
diversity) and 1 (maximum diversity). 
 
(ii) On the other hand there has to be a dynamic measure of the drive towards diversity that 
captures how much of additional diversity is produced per time period. Let us call this 
measure the diversity drive of period t, variable tdd . 
One possibility for this measure consists of simply counting of how many individuals of the 
most populous type are transferred to the least populous type per time period11. There 
certainly exist more sophisticated possibilities for this measure, but for the purpose at hand 
this one is sufficient. 
Note that at this level of analysis it is not necessary to specify why a certain drive to diversity 
exists. It can be conscious redistributive incomes policy in the macroeconomic sense, it can be 
diversity policy of firms, or it just can be explained by the general assumption that the species 
with the most rewarding dd behavior had been evolutionary selected in the distant past.  
 
Nevertheless some rather interesting results can already be derived at this general level. In a 
simulation study, using 6 types out of 6 possible types (i.e. concentrating on redistributive 
issues) and 60 individuals initially equally distributed, success of this species was measured 
by the average time that this species survived in a periodically changing environment. The 
window of survival of the environment was assumed to have size 2 (in each period 2 types 
were allowed to survive) and the speed of change of this window was experimented with. It 
was varied from change in every period to change every 20th period only. To see the influence 
of innate growth rates, these rates (uniform for all types) were changed from 10% to 20% to 
30%. Figure 2 shows a typical development of the population types over time with the 
window changing every 10 periods, am innate growth rate of 20% and diversity drive of 3. 
The population clearly survived the test of 100 periods. 
 
                                                 
11 If just one individual has to be assigned to (or taken away from) a set of types with equal population then the 
type is chosen with uniform probability. 
 
 
Figure 2: Survival in a periodically changing environment 
 
Note that due to the low number of types the randomness in the drive to diversity plays an 
important role. Due to that a large number of runs was performed and averaged for each 
parameter set. Without going into many details studied, a few results are important: 
 
As figure 3 shows survival increases dramatically in slowly changing environments combined 
with low drive to diversity (‘V-push’). Only if the environment changes every period, then the 
maximum diversity drive of 6 is optimal. This reassures the idea suggested by the archetype 
model that diversity (drive) should mirror the movement of the environment – slow change, 
slow drive. Innate growth in the graph shown was 10%, every increase clearly lead to longer 
survival. But even with 30% growth the survival in the fastest changing environment and 
drive to diversity of 6 was still 8 periods, only more stable environments did catch up easier. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Survival time as a function of speed of environmental change and drive to diversity 
 
Looking now at instantaneous diversity figure 4 reveals that there is a threshold of diversity 
drive (here between 3 and 4) where the evident negative relation between low diversity and 
long period of change can be overcome by a strong push towards diversity. 
 
Experiments with different innate growth rates show that this threshold moves up if growth 
gets stronger; for 30% growth it is between 5 and 6. 
 
The most interesting result of these experiments emerges if one looks at the optimal (in the 
sense of survival maximizing) instantaneous diversity. Plotting these optimal instantaneous 
diversity values against speed of environmental change, then an obviously negative 
relationship pops up (figure 5). For believers in the strength of evolutionary selection this 
indicates that faster changing environments will select more diverse populations. 
 
But note also how optimal instantaneous diversity was derived: For each speed the highest 
survival time was used to look up optimal drive to diversity (this relationship is shown in 
figure 6), and then the corresponding diversity was computed. 
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Figure 4: Instantaneous Diversity – the Variety Push Threshold 
As figure 5 shows, the crude suggestion implicit in the first archetype model is reappearing in 
 
Figure 5: Optimal variety determined by environmental change 
 
 
Datenre…
Datenre…
0,000
0,100
0,200
0,300
0,400
0,500
0,600
0,700
0,800
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
V-Push
Instantaneous
Diversity
Speed of change
of environment
Growth 20%
0,000
0,100
0,200
0,300
0,400
0,500
0,600
0,700
0,800
0,900
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
op
tim
al
 v
ar
ie
ty
change period
Environmental change and optimal variety
Growth 10%
Growth 20%
Growth 30%
this considerably more sophisticated dynamic setting: A certain drive to diversity is optimal 
for fast changing environments, and it leads to a negative relationship between a static 
measure of diversity and the periodicity of environmental change12. 
 
 
Figure 6: Optimal Drive to Diversity  
 
But figure 6 is also interesting in its own right: Notice that only in slowly changing 
environments the optimal drive to diversity increases with innate growth rates. The higher 
innate growth in slowly changing environments, the higher also the choice of optimal 
diversity push, i.e. redistribution! 
 
Extensions of this simulation model really open a Pandora’s Box and go far beyond the scope 
of this paper13. What has not been covered so far at all is the emergence of new types, which 
was the prime reason to include in the measure of instantaneous diversity both, an actual and 
potential number of types. Indeed, with this idea one enters the area of genetic algorithms. 
 
In a genetic algorithm the behavior of a type is represented as a bit string, and one could think 
of the innate growth rate of this type as its fitness function. The crucial assumption then is that 
                                                 
12 This result, of course, lies also at the heart of the choice of optimal portfolios in portfolio theory (see e.g. 
[Mishkin F.S. and Eakins S.G., 1998, pp. 73-86]). 
13 It is also interesting to incorporate and re-interpret standard concepts like the famous replicator dynamics. But 
again we have to refer to a more extensive treatment to be published soon. 
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parts of the bit strings of successful types can be clued together – and the new fitness of this 
newly born type is immediately available. In the standard applications fitness functions are 
taken to be constant over time and exogenously given. 
 
Taking a closer look at this assumption reveals even deeper problems: At first glance the bit 
strings are just names for algorithms, and names are much more compressed than the 
algorithm itself. Clearly each explicit algorithm can also be translated into a language of long 
bit strings – but it does not yield into a form amenable to crossing with other algorithms if it 
does not have any semantics. It needs a reference to objects outside its own language!14 
Plugging in pre-designed fitness functions obviously circumvents the problem that true 
innovation has. The search of genetic algorithms thus is only search for a solution that 
logically already is implicitly given in the fitness function - long before the search starts. 
Contrary to that, true innovation is not working on re-combination of (successful) names. It 
rather works on digesting, often imitating, pieces from sometimes quite distant areas of 
perception: successful innovators in other domains, inventions, non-economic social 
behaviors. And it fills it with a semantic re-interpretation that leads to economic action15. The 
agent - directly and indirectly - produces its own fitness function. 
 
To stress the comparison with genetic algorithms again: Consider the case that the bit strings 
are program names. The programs themselves are sequences of statements. Recombining 
partial statement sequences of different programs might sometimes – in a few cases – be 
possible. In most cases it certainly is nonsense. But even if a new combination would work, it 
still would be only an extremely small subset that would do something better than existing 
programs. To trust in random mutation in such a programming environment, not to speak of 
business environments, would be pointless. Indeed it needs an entity that anticipates the 
possible outcomes and pre-selects elements for combination before fitness is known or can be 
tested - in the economics of the last two centuries this entity has a name: the entrepreneur. 
And its predictive capacity has been labeled with a very indicative term by Schumpeter: 
vision. Vision in some sense is the antipode of the rational expectations approach. It is bound 
to be an attribute of a single entity rather than an assumption of some common knowledge. It 
is bound to fail most of the times just to support the variety needed to cope with changing 
environments, while the RE approach builds on static and exogenously given environments. 
‘Vision’ is bound to compress the enormous amount of perceived signals into a dense image 
that sometimes is difficult to justify (compare the notion of ‘dreaming’ that Freud, 
Schumpeter’s contemporary, so vividly introduced), while the RE approach assumes away all 
                                                 
14 ‘Evolution gives meaning to language.’, as Ariel Rubinstein has aptly dubbed this idea in the title of an essay 
on this topic [Rubinstein A., 2000, pp. 25-36]. 
15 The metaphor of the routines used by firms [Nelson and Winter, 1982] hints in the correct, the semantic, 
direction – but never was filled with economic life. 
signals that are not instantaneously translated into price signals, and simply ignores 
information processing capacity constraints of entities.  
 
Evolutionary, algorithmic approaches are on the verge to mimic this type of behavior, at least 
in some small, well documented areas of economic life. The most illuminating results of 
biologists which are of interest for economics in the future probably will come from areas that 
most evolutionary economists have not even touched upon yet:  
Note also that talking about new combinations is not talking about an analogue to the 
interaction between living systems and their selecting environment; it is talking about an 
analogue to sexual selection. The point is that making new combinations is intentional, i.e. 
maintenance of the own features enters an active search process – an abstract concept of an 
‘intentional nature’ somehow embedded in the environment is certainly less plausible than the 
analogue to sexual selection in the fauna. Many biologists view the re-combination via sexual 
selection as a means to lock-out the many small parasites that are the primal cause of death of 
large living systems. Sex, according to many biologists, has little to do with reproduction – so 
innovation (sic Schumpeter) might have little to do with capital growth. But to overcome such 
wild speculation a lot of theoretical work will have to be done. 
 
 
3 – Interdependent theory evolution, or ‘empirical singularities spark theory’  
 
As any brief survey of actual business life reveals, trial combinations are usually conditioned 
by expected goal achievement, which in turn differs not only in goal definition but also in the 
expectation formation process used. For economic settings often some kind of growth rate 
for a given time profile and with respect to a certain social entity (with a certain risk profile) 
is considered as goal variable. For example capitalist firms are thought to aim at an optimal 
time path of the growth rate of their capital, i.e. their profit rate16. With respect to the 
expectation process they use models of their socioeconomic and political environment, 
models which in turn include other model-building and goal-seeking entities like other firms, 
households, political units or some smaller units that constitute them. For households usually 
a similar framework – with utility growth playing the role of the goal variable –is proposed. 
Note that for innovation in firms, Schumpeter’s main focus in discussing new combinations, 
the firm’s expectation process includes an anticipation of the expectation processes of its 
customers17 as well as of its input providers (labor, intermediate products, infrastructure, etc.). 
So even if the goal set can be narrowed down to one variable, the expectation process 
                                                 
16 For the purpose at hand we ignore problems articulated by the assumption of independent (Keynesian) 
investment functions. 
17 In ‚Business Cycles’ Schumpeter for theoretical convenience assumes that the influence of the demand side 
can be neglected. Contrary to that in the ‘age of high mass consumption’ (Walt Rostock) after WW2 the 
influence of demand side preferences has surely grown considerably. 
necessary for anticipation is overwhelming – making Schumpeter’s reference to the 
entrepreneur’s instincts understandable. 
 
Compare again the fitness function used in genetic algorithms. Interpreted as hill-climbing 
algorithm, the closest analogue to expected growth evidently is the expected gradient. And if 
only a small set of past observations of this gradient are available, then strong assumptions 
about the functional form of the fitness function must substitute this lack of information; 
though this is seldom mentioned in standard formulations of genetic algorithms. It is therefore 
clearer, and easier to validate, if the actual behavior of entrepreneurs is mimicked directly. 
 
But which entrepreneurs should be modeled? New combinations in the recent decades most 
often enter the stage of innovation immediately as new combinations of entrepreneurial units, 
as conglomerates of new mergers, plus political units, plus certain consumer regions. As units 
grow larger, competition changes its character. It more often takes place between different 
sectors of the economy and between political actors hosting the giant corporations. 
Innovations thus take on the form of new contracts between these strata – the innovative 
product often degenerates to a marketing blip that does not reflect the underlying large scale 
innovation at all. It is just a superficial symbol for the households. While most of these 
characteristics point into the direction of a rather smooth, contractually secured economic 
development, it nevertheless bears the risk of infrequent, but heavy and deep crisis. 
 
 The most fundamental reason for this is the very fast growing interdependence of all 
economic actors. As is well known from network analysis the big advantage of such strongly 
connected networks is that they can digest the permanently occurring small shocks at all 
nodes particularly well, they even can swallow medium size shocks pretty well as long as no 
resonance effects amplify them. But innovations of the above mentioned kind become more 
and more large permanent shocks moving the economies ever further away from market- and 
expectation-equilibrium. They increasingly cause a kind of economic vibration throughout 
the world economy that might petrify potential competitors rather than challenge their 
innovative forces. The incredibly long period of low interest rates that has been experienced 
is just a reflection of this stagnating innovative power18. 
 
Looking back to chapter 2 there also the idea of larger and larger social entities has been 
implied. Diversity or more precisely the drive towards more diversity has been shown to play 
a decisive role in insuring units against changing circumstances. And, as can be learned from 
biology, large entities die from inner parasites rather than from heavy fights with their 
competitors. 
                                                 
18 This is not to say that profits or revenues are stagnating. It only holds that they are not built on innovation but 
rather on large scale redistribution of income from households and states to firms. As Schumpeter rightly 
anticipated, such a state of affairs cannot last too long.  
Innovation – the emergence of new combinations - in the just unfolding new century will have 
to change its character radically. Indeed it already has started to do so. It might well be that 
any further development of product or process innovation in the future will be conditioned by 
a large-scale institutional innovation19. Solutions to questions of political economy might turn 
out to be the only drivers that enable the introduction of basic innovations. In several respects 
the carrying capacity of our environment is almost reached – this is not so much concerning 
energy resources but much more concerning the hidden stress on global social relations. 
Schumpeter, as Marx, was particularly clear with respect to the past up to the time he lived in; 
and both were – as they admitted - particularly silent with respect to the future. 
 
What Schumpeterean economics has at its command therefore rather is a way of arguing, a 
way of generating theoretical insight by - innovation, producing new combinations! 
 
Two properties of applications often encountered in successful new combinations – in both, 
practical and theoretical innovations - can be stated: 
 
• Once a local optimum of old combinations is reached, i.e. experienced by stagnating 
goal achievement, it needs a somewhat wider jump away from this local point to find 
positive gradients leading to higher grounds. The role of experience of an innovating 
unit is particularly important with respect to the determination of what ‘somewhat 
wider’ means in a given context. 
• The urge for new combinations is based on contradictions experienced. Be it that 
they emerge within the entity, or be it that they are anticipated in environmental 
dynamics. 
 
Taking the toolbox of evolutionary biology on board of evolutionary economic modeling is an 
example that meets both criteria. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Schumpeter’s time, the room for new combinations undertaken by small social entities (small 
firms, households or even individuals) has almost vanished. Entrepreneurship in the classical 
sense of the function nowadays is almost exclusively a many-facetted and complicated 
process carried out by large transnational firms interacting with large political institutions. 
This trend has accelerated incredibly in the course of globalizing interdependencies in recent 
                                                 
19 It is interesting to see that even one of the most optimistic commentators of capitalisms innovation based 
success, William Baumol, senses major threats for this mode of production coming from macroeconomic 
relationships [Baumol W.J., 2002, pp. 262-282]. A far less sanguine account of capitalisms prospects due to 
institutional sclerosis can be found in [Cornwall J. and Cornwall W., 2001, pp. 261-269]. 
decades. New combinations in contemporary societies are a matter of far reaching 
interventions in the political economy. 
 
But – contrary to Schumpeter’s melancholic baseline – we hold that this is not just the end of 
a story. It is simultaneously the beginning of a new story. And we even suggest that this 
story is again a story of innovation, of new combinations. Large scale social innovations, 
innovations concerning the mechanisms of political economy will enable and condition all 
other types of innovations. And science, in particular evolutionary political economy, 
hopefully will be able to give some guidance to this process. To do so, it needs new 
combinations itself. 
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